Iran on the Boil

Adding onto today's David Brooks' column (posted earlier) on the four schools of thought on dealing with Iran, here we have Israel making noise about joining the Pre-Emptionists; via the AP:

Israel's defense minister hinted Saturday that the Jewish state is preparing for military action to stop
Iran's nuclear program, but said international diplomacy must be the first course of action.

"Israel will not be able to accept an Iranian nuclear capability and it must have the capability to defend itself, with all that that implies, and this we are preparing," Shaul Mofaz said.

His comments at an academic conference stopped short of overtly threatening a military strike but were likely to add to growing tensions with Iran.
[...]
Israel's Mofaz said sanctions and international oversight of Iran's nuclear program stood as the "correct policy at this time."

Newsweek's Fareed Zakaria adds his two cents to the military option and sanctions debates:

At best a strike would set back Iran's program by a few years. But it would inflame public opinion there and unify the nation in its determination to go nuclear. It is a substantial country—with three times the population of Iraq, for example—that has a powerful sense of national pride. And Iran would have many ways of retaliating, especially with 140,000 American troops next door in Iraq.

Sanctions will not work. Iran is the world's second largest oil exporter, with tens of billions of dollars in surplus cash these days. If we have few sticks, we also have few carrots. It's probably worth offering a package of real benefits—mostly as a signal to the Iranian people that we want good relations with them in return for cooperation on nukes—but I have no illusions that it would be accepted. The current regime does not want good relations with the West. It knows that more trade, contact and collaboration only undermine its grip on its society.

So what options do we have? Mr. Zakaria urges some out-of-the-box thinking:

The United States should begin the construction of an alliance to contain Iran. Our goals should be to prevent or massively slow down the weaponization of Iran's nuclear program, and to frustrate its meddling in the region, support for terrorism and opposition to a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

This is not a best-case outcome, but it has its virtues. The existence of a clear and present danger in Iran will keep the international community galvanized. Already, the Western alliance has been strengthened in response to Iran's belligerence, and cooperation with India, Russia and China seems a stronger possibility than ever before.

Threats usually have the effect of sobering up the neighborhood. If Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other countries see that they face a serious problem in Iran, they might recognize that they could use outside allies. American influence in the region could become stronger and be used to push for cooperation on other foreign-policy issues, as well as economic and political reform. Notice how the rise of China has Japan and India moving closer to the United States. The Soviet threat brought Western Europe closer to the United States. It's not inconceivable that a similar dynamic could work in the Middle East.

[...]

This does not mean accepting a nuclear-armed Iran. Tehran is many years away from nuclear weapons. Its program is not that sophisticated, and moving to a serious weapons capability isn't that easy, particularly if there is a concerted global effort to slow it down. The regime in Iran is not stable and the fissures in Iran will only grow. Regime change, however, is not going to take place at our will and on our timetable. Outside forces can help. But we will slow change in Iran if we feed the feeling that America is humiliating it. Let us not believe one more time that people in a foreign country will welcome American bombs with sweets and flowers.