From the You've-Gotta-Be-Shitting-Me Department

One wonders what Dear Leader is smoking on his trip to the G8 summit in St. Petersburg (via CNN):

"I talked about my desire to promote institutional change in parts of the world, like Iraq where there's a free press and free religion, and I told him that a lot of people in our country would hope that Russia would do the same," Bush said.

To that, Putin replied, "We certainly would not want to have the same kind of democracy that they have in Iraq, quite honestly."

No, I don't think Mr. Putin would like to model his own authoritarian democracy on the chaos that is Iraq:

Gunmen in Iraq have kidnapped the country's Olympic committee chief and 30 other officials, police have told the BBC.

Olympic chief Ahmed al-Hadjiya and the officials were taken when their convoy was stopped by uniformed men.
[...]
The BBC's Adam Brookes in Baghdad said it was unclear where they were taken.

He said the officials were on their way to the conference in Baghdad's Sadoun district in a fleet of as many as 20 cars when they were stopped by the uniformed men. "They took control of the convoy, and it was forced to drive away," our correspondent said.

The Economist has some thoughts on how G8 leaders can prod Putin:

So what can the West do? The short answer is, not a lot. In the 1990s an economically enfeebled Russia needed help from abroad. Unless the oil price unexpectedly collapses, no such leverage will be available in the near future. Politically, too, pressure from outside is likely to rebound. With the Kremlin once again firmly in control, Russia will almost certainly change only from within—or not at all.

This is not to say that the West has no influence. Mr Putin, like other Russian leaders before him, is sensitive to outside criticism. The Kremlin was this week in high dudgeon because senior Western officials attended a conference in Moscow organised by some of Mr Putin's few remaining opponents. The Russians are also neurotically keen to curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations.

Here lie some clues to what Western leaders should and should not do about Russia. They should speak out against Mr Putin's moves away from democracy, against his policy in Chechnya, or against Russian use of energy to bully its neighbours (many west European countries have been too timid in their criticism). They should continue to help NGOs and others who are trying to establish a civil society that may, one day, provide an alternative to the dead weight of the Kremlin. As the next presidential election of March 2008 nears, they should insist that any move to amend the constitution so that Mr Putin can run again is unacceptable—and would result in Russia's expulsion from the G8. They should do what they can to press for free and fair elections, even if the Kremlin's chosen candidate seems sure to win.

There are things they should not do, as well. Russia's membership of the G8 may be an embarrassment, since it is supposedly a club of democracies. But to throw it out now would only push Russia farther out of the West's orbit, and risk making it even less helpful over such issues as curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions. Equally, Americans and Europeans are right to assist countries in Russia's near-abroad that want to escape its baleful influence. But to push for Ukraine or Georgia, say, to join NATO before they are ready would serve no good purpose. Above all, Western leaders should avoid giving the impression that what they really object to is not an illiberal and undemocratic Russia but a strong and rich one—a paranoia that even Russia's few remaining liberals all too often share.

Suggesting that Russia model its governance on liberal democracies is one thing, but Bush's insistence on using Iraq as a display model is simply cockamamie and will do little to engage Putin.