Paths of Glory

Here's some more sampling of reaction to today's "major speech" by President Bush, outlining our strategery for victory in Iraq. First up, Fred Kaplan over at Slate:

The most remarkable thing about the document President George W. Bush released today, titled National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, is that it was released today (and written not much earlier—it's authored by the National Security Council and dated November 2005).

It is symptomatic of everything that's gone wrong with this war that, after two and a half years of fighting it (and four years after starting to plan it), the White House is just now getting around to articulating a strategy for winning it.

To put this in perspective: From December 1941 to August 1945, the U.S. government mobilized an entire nation; manufactured a mighty arsenal; played a huge role in defeating the armies, air forces, and navies of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan; and emerged from battle poised to shape the destiny of half the globe. By comparison, from September 2001 to December 2005, the U.S. government has advanced to the point of describing a path to victory in a country the size of California.
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First, though the document is called a "strategy for victory," Bush doesn't clearly define either term. And even where he defines the terms nebulously or inconsistently, he doesn't tie them to the more pressing questions now consuming public discussion of the war: What do we do now? When can we start to pull out—under what circumstances, with what sorts of troops remaining, to what end, for how long?

In the speech, Bush says (as he has said many times before), "We will stay as long as necessary to complete the mission." But what is the mission? At one point he says, "When our mission of training the Iraqi security forces is complete, our troops will return home to a proud nation." However, a bit later, he says the mission will be complete "when the terrorists and Saddamists can no longer threaten Iraq's democracy," and he adds, "I will settle for nothing less than complete victory."

So, which is it: Our job is done when the Iraqis can fight the bad guys on their own—or when the bad guys are defeated? Those are two very different standards, involving very different benchmarks of progress.

And while not a direct reaction to today's speech, Jefferson Morley notes in his World Opinion Roundup over at the WaPo that not everyone is giddy over the prospect of a US pull-out:

But the prospect of a U.S. draw down is not necessarily good news for the region, says columnist Abdul Wahab in the pan-Arab daily Dar al Hayat.

"The good news about withdrawal is of primary interest to the American public and other parties. However, the bad news is that the occupying forces have failed to establish a situation on the ground paving the way for the withdrawal. On the contrary, it has sowed and encouraged all elements of rifts. After saving the Iraqis from a vile despotic regime, the occupation brought a violent terrorist organization.

U.S. withdrawal, Wahab says, must be preceded by a new U.S. political approach "to guarantee the success of the reconciliation effort and include everyone in the political process. Should the Americans fail, another time, their withdrawal will bring more calamities than their occupation."