Popular Dissent

The AP has a poll out about how BushCo is handling the war in Iraq, and the numbers keep sinking; you can see the full results here from the Minneapolis Star/Tribune:

1. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Bush administration has conducted the war in Iraq? (IF APPROVE/DISAPPROVE, ASK:) Is that strongly or somewhat? (Results from June 2005 in parentheses) —Strongly approve, 20 percent (26) —Somewhat approve, 16 percent (15) —Somewhat disapprove, 13 percent (11) —Strongly disapprove, 45 percent (45) —Not sure, 5 percent (3) TOTAL APPROVE — 37 percent (41) TOTAL DISAPPROVE — 58 percent (56)

But the kicker is this question:

6. Do you think it is OK for people who oppose the war in Iraq to express their opposition publicly, or not? —Yes, 87 percent —No, 12 percent —Not sure, 1 percent

Speaking of dissenting to BushCo Iraq war policies, General Wesley Clark has some thoughts in a Washington Post editorial on changes in tactic from the heavy hand that BushCo has been using up to this point:

Adding a diplomatic track to the strategy is a must. The United States should form a standing conference of Iraq's neighbors, complete with committees dealing with all the regional economic and political issues, including trade, travel, cross-border infrastructure projects and, of course, cutting off the infiltration of jihadists. The United States should tone down its raw rhetoric and instead listen more carefully to the many voices within the region. In addition, a public U.S. declaration forswearing permanent bases in Iraq would be a helpful step in engaging both regional and Iraqi support as we implement our plans. On the political side, the timeline for the agreements on the Constitution is less important than the substance of the document. It is up to American leadership to help engineer, implement and sustain a compromise that will avoid the "red lines" of the respective factions and leave in place a state that both we and Iraq's neighbors can support. So no Kurdish vote on independence, a restricted role for Islam and limited autonomy in the south. And no private militias. In addition, the United States needs a legal mandate from the government to provide additional civil assistance and advice, along with additional U.S. civilian personnel, to help strengthen the institutions of government. Key ministries must be reinforced, provincial governments made functional, a system of justice established (and its personnel trained) and the rule of law promoted at the local level. There will be a continuing need for assistance in institutional development, leadership training and international monitoring for years to come, and all of this must be made palatable to Iraqis concerned with their nation's sovereignty. Monies promised for reconstruction simply must be committed and projects moved forward, especially in those areas along the border and where the insurgency has the greatest potential. On the military side, the vast effort underway to train an army must be matched by efforts to train police and local justices. Canada, France and Germany should be engaged to assist. Neighboring states should also provide observers and technical assistance. In military terms, striking at insurgents and terrorists is necessary but insufficient. Military and security operations must return primarily to the tried-and-true methods of counterinsurgency: winning the hearts and minds of the populace through civic action, small-scale economic development and positive daily interactions.