Crossing the Atlantic
Mrs. F and I made it back to the States from our honeymoon in Paris happily rested and rejuvenated for our busy work lives again (and I think we even lost a few pounds on the Sauna Flight home--thanks Northwest for that bonus service).

One of the news stories that made big news in Europe while I was in Paris for the last several weeks was the so-called "Downing Street Memo," which are actually the minutes of a meeting of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and his cabinet in July of 2002. (It was leaked just days before the British elections, which Blair's Labour party won with a reduced majority.) I blogged about it back on the third of May and thought I would definitely be behind the curve on it. But it seems that it hasn't caused the furor here that it did in the UK and Europe. Yet. It's just now starting to get traction here in the US, now that the runaway bride hoopla has died down (boy, am I glad I was out of the country for that one).

You can see the memo in full thanks to DowningstreetMemo.com, but here are some of the highlights (none of which have been disavowed by Blair--his main comment was that it was he that convinced the US to go to the UN, but he never denied the crux of the memo, which was that the US was essentially molding justification for the war via intelligence and the press):

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. [...] The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.